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CHANGING POLICY ROLES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE
Dr. Devra Lee Davis*
Environmental scientists are increasingly asked for ad­
vice nowadays by the regulatory agencies. We need to be careful 
to communicate that advice precisely. A  colleague of mine re­
ported the following misunderstanding which bears repeating. 
A  patient called and complained that he was very tired and had 
little energy for his wife. My friend advised him to walk ten 
miles a day and call back in a month to see how he was doing. 
He phoned and said "Doc, I feel much better now. I've been 
walking ten miles a day, and I have much more energy. There's 
only one problem. I’m 300 miles from home."
REACTIVE AND ANTICIPATORY 
REGULATORY POLICIES
Environmental scientists can give advice, but such advice 
is limited by past observations, available data, and typically 
imperfect understanding of physical and biological systems. It 
is useful to think of two fundamentally distinct types of envi­
ronmental policy—those that are reactive, with which we are 
all familiar as readers of the daily newspaper; and those that 
are anticipatory. Anticipatory policies are designed to prevent 
disease or environmental impacts before they occur. In the en­
vironmental health field, studies will provide the reactive 
confirmation of past hazards; for the primary prevention of 
disease, experimental techniques and models of human risk 
based on animal data will be essential.
In my remarks today, I will briefly indicate the socio-le- 
gal context for the interdependence of environmental health 
science and environmental law, and discuss their respective 
evolutions. I will also suggest that recent twists in environ­
mental law and the growth of the animal protection movement 
have substantially altered the expectations about what envi­
ronmental health scientists can do; these changed expecta­
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tions may pervert the original intent of much public health 
legislation. And I will remind you that for the most part, envi­
ronmental health science is best suited to confirming past 
risks, and not well equipped to predict, and hence prevent, fu­
ture risks (see Table 1).
The subject of my talk today is also that of co-develop­
ment—namely the development of environmental law and en­
vironmental science, with the emphasis on epidemiology, in 
particular. In contrast to those subtle relationships between 
species that provide fodder for poetic essays, environmental 
law and science occupy less harmonious ecological relation­
ships.
TABLE 1: ROLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT*
1. The identification of hazard.
This requires an answer to the question, "Does X  cause Y 
in Z?"
2. The assessment of dose-response.
This characterizes the relationship between a specific 
concentration of a substance and the development of as­
sociated health outcomes.
3. Exposure assessment.
This involves the measurement or estimation of the 
strength, number and pattern of human or environmental 
exposures to a specific substance.
4. Risk characterization.
This employs all these factors and provides a quantitative 
range of risks associated with specified exposures in cer­
tain populations.
* Data from: National Research Council. Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process. Washington, D.C.: National Press, 1983.
BASIC SCIENCE-FORCING LAWS
During its environmental heyday, the United States 
Congress enacted a number of laws which form the progeny of 
this wedding and may be thought of as "basic science-forcing." 
Including the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, these laws authorize agencies to take 
regulatory action on the grounds that a given compound poses 
or may pose an unreasonable risk of causing a host of adverse 
health effects. In this regard, preventing or reducing exposure 
to toxic chemicals becomes a form of preventive medicine. For 
many effects of interest, such as neurological diseases, there 
are no generally agreed-upon epidemiologic methods for
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evaluating the risk. For others, such as cancer, animal models 
have been generally accepted, but are not without their critics.
Given the anticipatory, preventive thrust of these basic 
science-forcing environmental laws, toxicology and related 
experimental techniques for estimating risks were expected to 
play an important role in identifying priority problems. 
Courts were especially inclined in earlier stages of environ­
mental law to interpret experimental and theoretical evidence 
liberally that a given exposure constituted an "unreasonable'1 
risk. Science was pushed and prodded to devise methods for 
anticipating and predicting harm to public health and envi­
ronment. As a retrospective science, epidemiology was not ex­
pected to play a major role in the development of preventive 
regulatory policy.
ANTICIPATORY POLICIES
Briefly, consider some of the early case law in this regard. 
In Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the level of proof required under the Clean Air Act 
for a finding of endangerment did not require proof of actual 
harm, but only proof of a "significant risk of harm." (541 F. 2d 
at 13; cert, denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)). Indeed, the agency was 
not even required to prove that harm was "probable," but 
rather that there was a rational basis for inferring harm. In 
this case, the inferred harm occurred to the intellectual growth 
and development of inner city children. EPA based its decision 
on three types of evidence: theoretical modeling of lead dust, 
epidemiologic and clinical studies of exposed populations, and 
laboratory studies of animals. The Court argued that where the 
risk averted was of major consequence, conclusive proof was 
not required. In a later case on the same issue (Lead Industries 
Association v. EPA), the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s air quality 
standards for lead, commenting that conflicting evidence did 
not undermine agency action. So long as EPA could show a ra­
tional basis for its actions, it could rely on evidence on the 
frontiers of science.
SOME RESERVATIONS 
ABOUT USE OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TODAY
Basic science-forcing laws laid a framework and stimu­
lated funding for research and development of toxicological 
tests to predict and anticipate human risks. However, precisely 
because the animal models on which much environmental 
regulation rests are models designed to anticipate human and
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environmental effects, their validation and development re­
main the subject of intense debate.
Several basic scientific assumptions form contemporary 
U.S. laws. Key among these is the policy judgment that studies 
indicating that a given chemical causes adverse effects in ani­
mals should be regarded as implicating this same chemical as 
a hazard to humans. This tenet rests on scientific evidence 
amassed to date and also embraces a fundamental principle of 
preventive medicine and public policy. It is far better, easier, 
and more cost-effective to prevent diseases from developing 
than it is to pay the costs of treating those diseases once they 
become evident. Consider the tremendous investment in clean­
up of hazardous wastes in the U.S. today: Whatever it will cost 
to clean up the thousands of sites now contaminated with pre­
viously misused industrial materials, it would have cost far 
less to have used them prudently in the past.
As to the technical basis for the assumed utility of studies 
on animals for predicting human effects, all of the compounds 
found to cause cancer in humans also cause cancer in animals. 
Moreover, the majority of compounds in commerce have not 
been adequately tested for their potential human toxicity, nor 
are data likely to become available based on human exposures, 
which can be erratic for the purposes of scientific assessment. 
Consequently, prudent public policy requires that experimen­
tal studies become the fulcrum on which regulatory actions 
rest. In this regard, those charged with environmental protec­
tion will continue to develop methods for systematically eval­
uating the risks of environmental pollution, through the tech­
niques generally referred to as risk assessment. These tech­
niques are driven by the laws that require them, but offer an 
important tool for evaluating potential, relative hazard of ma­
terials of interest.
In the U.S. a number of institutions have taken responsi­
bility for conducting tests on potential hazardous substances. 
One of these is the toxicology program of the National Institute 
for Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), which supports 
basic research on chemical toxicity, primarily carcinogenic­
ity. In addition, the regulatory agencies have developed sys­
tematic methods for using these data in reaching administra­
tive decisions about risks. Guidelines for the assessment of 
cancer, reproductive, and neurological toxicity are under 
development in the U.S. by the EPA. The fundamental 
scientific principles for these assessments have been reviewed 
and evaluated by the National Research Council (NRC) in a 
series o f publications, including most recently, Drinking 
Water and Health, volume VI.
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EXPANDED ROLE FOR EPIDEMIOLOGY IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
Questions about quantifying risks for humans, based on 
the animal data, often lead to calls for epidemiologic confir­
mation of risk assessments. I want to suggest briefly why this 
is a mistaken notion.
First of all, many of the compounds of regulatory interest 
cannot be studied with the tools of epidemiology. Either expo­
sures are erratic, records on exposures cannot be reconstructed, 
or the exposed population may be too small to permit statisti­
cal evaluation of health status.
Secondly, where studies do exist on exposure to toxic 
chemicals, these commonly involve worker populations, 
which include healthy, working persons and not the typical 
U.S. population of young, old, and ill persons, as well as the 
healthy working population.
Finally, for many compounds of interest, such as ethylene 
oxide or the new generation of pesticides, chronic health ef­
fects with longer latencies may be involved. There has been a 
doubling in the 1970s, compared to the 1960s, of the production 
of many synthetic organic chemicals. Chronic effects of these 
exposures may not be evident until the end of this century.
Unlike many of the sciences which draw on statistics and 
are permitted relative obscurity, epidemiology captures a lot of 
public attention. As one researcher put it, "If you ever want to 
be intensely peer reviewed, produce a study that has millions of 
dollars of regulatory consequences." Love Canal, Alsea, Times 
Beach, Woburn, all have in common that they were places of 
toxic pollution and subjects of multimiliion dollar lawsuits. 
Objective information in these circumstances may be an oxy­
moron.
EXPANDED ROLE FOR EPIDEMIOLOGY UNDER SUPERFUND
Let me close with a warning about some new directions for 
epidemiology that may prove to be a new "tar baby." You will 
recall Brer Fox tried to trick Brer Rabbit into playing with the 
tar baby, knowing that once he had handled it, he would be so 
caught up, he would not be able to move. The recently passed 
Superfund legislation calls for health assessments of proposed 
superfund sites. These health assessments can include 
epidemiologic studies of exposed persons. Conventional epi­
demiologic studies of many potential superfund sites are likely 
to be of limited value, despite their obvious promise for gradu­
ate student training programs. To be effective, such health as­
sessments will need to rely heavily on experimental models of 
adverse health consequences. No amount of congressional
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wishing, nor political jockeying will alter this fact: epidemio­
logic studies in these situations, as in most others, will con­
firm past damage, but will do little to prevent or anticipate fu­
ture harm.
That great philosopher Woody Allen, ended his period 
piece of the 70s film ’'Annie Hall” with a story about a guy who 
loved his brother dearly; but there was only one problem. His 
brother thought he was a chicken. When asked, "Well, why 
don’t you tell him the truth...that he is not a chicken, help him 
to face reality?” The fellow replied, "I can’t. I need the eggs.” 
Epidemiology may well be the eggs of environmental policy. We 
cannot strictly speaking ever know the value of our control 
policies. Because in implementing them, we change the envi­
ronment, and other factors are certainly important determi­
nants of public health as well; these are beyond our control, 
and it may be beyond our ability to study them systematically. 
But, we need the eggs in the sense that we must try to under­
stand what we have done.
REFERENCES
National Research Council, Drinking Water and Health, Vol­
ume 6, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986.
National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process, Washington, D.C.: Na­
tional Academy Press, 1983.
National Research Council, Toxicity Testing: Strategies to De­
termine Needs and Priorities, Washington, D.C.: National 
Academy Press, 1984.
i
